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Paul Schwartz*
The modern family is, in some ways, a world of its own, whose special
character can be described in terms of privacy and of autonomy. An
increase in privacy and a development of domestic intimacy from the
Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century made the family something sep-
arate from the rest of the human world. Without this boundary, which
Philippe Aries terms a "mini'mun de secret," the modern family, with its
strong sense of an interior, communal life, would not have taken its pres-
ent form.' The privacy and distance from the exterior world which
have defined the modern family from its beginnings have given it a
sphere of autonomy in which to operate. This sphere of independent
operation has been accorded constitutional status in the United States.
Although conceding that the rights of parenthood are not without
limits, the Supreme Court has identified a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter. ' '2 Constitutional protection has been ex-
tended to individuals engaged in activities related to marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, abortion, family relationships, and the raising of
children.3 The ultimate basis of this constitutional protection is the doc-
trine of substantive due process, though other grounds have been found
in some cases.
4
Louise Armstrong and James Fishkin believe that this sphere of fam-
ily autonomy must now be limited in new ways. Armstrong, author of
The Home Front.- Notes from the Family War Zone, believes that membership
in an American family somehow deprives wives and children of consti-
* B.A., Brown University, 1981; J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1985.
1. Philippe Ari s, L'enfant etla viefamiliale sous l'ancen rigime 267 (1960). The phrase is lost
in the English translation of Aries' work. See P. Aries, Centuries of Childhood 375 (R. Baldick
trans., 1962).
2. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
3. Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the FamilY, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1161-97
(1980), gives a thorough account of the extent and sources of constitutional protection for the
family.
4. See id. at 1193 (The Supreme Court "has shown itself capable of recasting virtually any
intrusion on substantive due process rights as an equal protection problem").
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tutional protections they would otherwise possess. 5 This deprivation
permits their victimization at the hands of violent and sexually abusive
husbands and fathers.
6
In justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family, Fishkin argues that the
family is a crucial source of inequality in America.' According to
Fishkin, liberal theory legitimates the unequal distribution of goods in
society by an ideal of fair competition among individuals. 8 But this
ideal is threatened by the autonomy granted the family to control the
development of its children, which allows the offspring of advantaged
parents greater opportunity to develop "the skills, credentials, and moti-
vations valued in that society." 9
As these writers demonstrate, the family can be analyzed from both
the outside looking in (Fishkin) and the inside looking out (Armstrong).
Armstrong is concerned with the way families operate at the expense of
some of their individual members. Fishkin, in contrast, focuses on the
way families, by helping their members, prevent society from adhering
to certain liberal values.
I The Family as Pri'vate Battleground
The Home Front begins with Armstrong's claim that the book's goal is
not to display the "awfulness" of all men but to study the male domestic
violence that society refuses to strongly condemn.' 0 By domestic vio-
lence Armstrong means "serious (and most often often-repeated) behav-
ior which would be criminal if directed toward a stranger."" These are
crimes such as aggravated assault, assault with intent to kill, rape, and
child molestation. "What we seem to have with crimes in the home are
Status Non-Offenses. Crimes which would be crimes if the victim were
a stranger, but are not because the only victim is 'only' a part of the
family."' 2 Armstrong, however, has formulated the problem in a mis-
leading way, and this fundamental flaw is exacerbated by her tendency
toward sweeping generalizations.
Despite Armstrong's language to the contrary, crimes within the
household are indeed crimes; wives, mothers, and children are "persons"
5. ARMSTRONG, pp. 40, 72, 197, 198.
6. Id. at 40, 74.
7. FISHKIN, p. 1.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 54.
10. ARMSTRONG, p. Xviii.
11. Id. at 2-3.
12. Id. at 43.
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under the Constitution; and family crimes are within the jurisdiction of
the state.
The Supreme Court has declared that "Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state
defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights."' 3 Most states have gen-
eral criminal sanctions against physical abuse, which serve to prohibit
spousal assaults, and most have special statutes which criminalize child
abuse.14 California penalizes any person who causes any child physical
pain or mental suffering, under circumstances likely to produce great
bodily harm or death, with imprisonment for a period of less than a year
in a county jail, or from two to four years in a state prison. 15 Texas
treats intentional, reckless, or criminally negligent conduct which causes
serious bodily or mental injury to a child as a felony of the second de-
gree, punishable with prison terms of from two to twenty years.
16
If the world is not as lawless as Armstrong thinks, neither is it as or-
derly as these statutes imply. Armstrong has confused matters by seem-
ing to locate the problem in an illusory decriminalization when its real
source is the fashion in which laws are enforced. For while wife-beating
and child abuse are illegal, the mere existence of statutory law and the
rest of the formal legal structure does not answer the problem of family
violence. What ultimately matters is how social workers, physicians,
teachers, civil servants, and policemen take statutes into account as they
respond to domestic violence. And the evidence suggests both that these
individuals do not fully obey the relevant statutes, 17 and that the sanc-
13. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (citations
omitted).
14. M. Rosenthal, Physical Abuse of Children by Parents.- The Crbnina'zation Decision 7 AM. J.
OF CRIM. L. 141, 142 (1979); Report N.Y. State Assembly Select Comm. on Child Abuse,
Appoztment of Counselfor the Abused Child, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 177, 178 (1972).
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 273(a) (West Supp. 1984). By 1967 every state had "reporting"
laws which require health and school authorities, as well as other professionals who come into
contact with children under twelve, to report cases of child abuse even if the report is based
on suspicion alone. D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 72 (1970).
16. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83), TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 12.33(a) (Vernon 1974).
17. The failure of the police to take adequate measures to protect victims of domestic
violence has resulted in court cases. See, e.g., Nearing v. Weaver, 52 U.S.L.W. 2224 (Or. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 25, 1983) (Police officers who knowingly fail to enforce a court order, issued under
Oregon's Abuse Prevention Act, by not arresting estranged husband who entered home and
assaulted wife in violation of that order are potentially liable for harm to wife's emotional and
physical health); Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1977), (In an action
brought against employees of police department, probation department, and family court on
ground that defendants had failed to protect and assist wives assaulted by their husbands,
sufficient evidence existed to preclude summary judgment for the defendants), rev'd on other
grounds, 64 A.D. 2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), a fd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419
N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
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tions of the criminal law are not invoked as frequently as they might
be. 1
8
Despite its misleading implication that family violence has been
decriminalized, The Home Front correctly identifies the way these crimes
are sometimes perceived. Domestic violence is often deemed a problem
to be addressed by psychological therapy.19 Though the worst cases of
abuse are usually handled by the criminal justice system, it is common
for criminal sanctions to remain uninvoked even when a spouse or child
is seriously injured. Often in such situations, as Armstrong points out,
legal protections and safeguards are less valued than are "imprecations
to the therapeutical gods."'20 If at all possible, husbands and fathers are
not to be punished; instead, families are to be treated.
Psychology's role in the response to family violence is promoted by
the shortage of hard evidence in intra-family disputes. In the absence of
other evidence, decisions involving child custody, visitation rights, and
the pressing of criminal charges turn on the results of psychological
profiles of husband and wife. 2 1 Armstrong is critical of this reliance, and
little wonder. Although these tests are deemed objective, they may
favor males, and they do depend heavily on the inevitably subjective
interpretation of psychologists. 22 The shortcomings of these psychologi-
cal tests are exacerbated by the weight which they are expected to bear.
The most telling point Armstrong makes in The Home Front concerns
this therapeutic approach to domestic violence. At present, battering
husbands and fathers are often excluded from criminal court because
they are otherwise non-violent. Armstrong argues that these battering
men should be seen as criminals with a specialty: preying on victims to
whom they are related.23 While the very extent of domestic violence
raises doubts about the practicality of employing criminal sanctions
against its perpetrators, 24 an increase in the use of arrests and selective
18. See Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 151; See generally Goodpaster & Angel, Child Abuse and
the Law. The California System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1975) (discussing implementation of
California child abuse law in Los Angeles County).
19. ARMSTRONG, pp. 37-62.
20. Id. at 45.
21. Id. at 51-54. The profiles are drawn with the help of a staggering array of tests, in-
cluding the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory,
the Reverse Border Gestalt, and the Thematic Apperception Test.
22. Id. at 51.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Laurie Woods, the Executive Director of the National Center on Women and Family
Law, has acknowledged that it is impractical to expect that all men who assault their wives
will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Given that at least five million married
women are regularly beaten in the United States, the legal system would be enormously
overburdened if each case was prosecuted to the full extent possible. Woods, Litigation on
Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 7, 12 (1978). In addition to the burden
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incarcerations might deter violence without placing enormous burdens
on an overloaded criminal justice system.
The essence of Armstrong's argument is that membership in an Amer-
ican family robs women and children of constitutional protections they
should have. Yet even the faith of a potentially sympathetic reader is
tried by The Home Front. The book's credibility is weakened by its inade-
quate analysis of the legal matters under consideration. A chapter-long
analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Parham v. JR. ,25 for example,
is intended to show the deplorable state of children's rights at present.
26
But Armstrong loads her deck by over'emphasizing the relative defer-
ence which the Court pays to parental authority while ignoring the lim-
its placed on this power.27 In addition to offering this distorted reading
of Parham, Armstrong attempts to manipulate her audience by shame-
lessly exploiting the story of one of the institutionalized children on
whose behalf the class action was brought.
28
The final, dubious achievement of The Home Front is the way it can
induce skepticism in those who might be believers. Perhaps the strong-
est doubts are raised by Armstrong's exclusive focus on men as perpetra-
tors of abuse. The role of women in domestic violence is not simply that
of victim: in one nationwide survey of child abuse, fifty-one percent of
the victims were abused by females.29 Armstrong defends the exclusive
scope of her book with the unsupported assertion that society has no
reluctance to condemn those women who engage in domestic violence.
30
But as long as we fail to examine honestly the role of women as perpe-
trators as well as victims, we will not fully comprehend the tragedy of
domestic violence: the way it perpetuates itself. Today's abused chil-
that full enforcement of criminal sanctions would place on the criminal justice system, experi-
ence in the field of child psychology shows that disruption of intact families, except in ex-
treme cases, usually does more harm than good to the children involved. See J. GOLDSTEIN,
A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3-8, 48-50 (1973).
25. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
26. In Parham the Court held that, absent a finding of abuse or neglect, parents must have
a substantial role in the decision whether to commit their child to a state administered mental
institution. 442 U.S. at 604. This result follows from "[t]he law's concept of the family,"
which "rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience,
and capacity of judgment required for making life's difficult decisions." Id. at 602.
27. The Parham Court placed a considerable limit on parental authority by giving the
final say in commitment decisions to a neutral factfinder. 442 U.S. at 606-7. One commenta-
tor suggests that the Court's decision defers not to parents but to "state-employed behavioral
professionals." Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 329, 334.
28. Within nine pages Armstrong tells us once that the second-named plaintiff wanted
only "to be loved," twice that he was "hungry for love," and twice that he "needed love
incredibly." ARMSTRONG, pp. 150-159.
29. GIL, supra note 15, at 117.
30. ARMSTRONG, p. xix.
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dren are tomorrow's abusive parents.3 1 From the conviction that there
is no place like home, we have come to recognize that, for many Ameri-
cans, "There is no place so violent as home.
'32
Ii The Family As Political Contradiction
While Armstrong advocates a policy of state intervention in families
for the protection of wives and children, Fishkin'sJustize, Equal Opportu-
nity, and the Family raises the possibility of limiting family autonomy to
further certain goals of liberalism. Argued on the level of ideal theory,
the book postulates a modern industrial society enjoying the best condi-
tions that might realistically be obtained. This theoretical approach
permits a number of insights about current liberal ideals.
Fishkin identifies a basic conflict between the autonomy of the family
and two central liberal assumptions about equal opportunity. The first
liberal assumption he terms the "principle of merit." This principle re-
quires procedural fairness in the evaluation of qualifications for posi-
tions. Although debate is possible about how qualifications for specific
positions are to be defined, discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or
ethnic origin is forbidden. 33 The second assumption is "equality of life
chances." According to this supposition, the class, race, sex or ethnic
origin of any individual should not affect his eventual social position. 34
These two assumptions define an ideal of fair competition. 35 As for fam-
ily autonomy, it refers to the customary protection of families from so-
cial interference because they seem to represent the best way of
satisfying the essential needs of children. Thus, parents are generally
free to raise their children as they see fit, regardless of whether their
children might be better raised by another. 36
When the value of equal opportunity, defined by merit and equality
of life chances, confronts family autonomy, a pattern of difficult choices
emerges, which Fishkin describes as a "trilemma." Commitment to any
two of the three assumptions rules out the third.37 For Fishkin this diffi-
31. "The most consistent features of the histories of abusive families is the repetition, from
one generation to the next, of a pattern of abuse, neglect, and parental loss or deprivation."
R. KEMPE & C.H. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE 12 (1978). See GIL, supra note 15, at 114, 140.
32. Anderson, Azwate Violence, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 18. This issue of TIME had domestic
violence as its cover story.
33. FiSHKIN, p. 4.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 78. See Santosky v. Kramer 445 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evap-
orate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of
their child to the State").
37. FISHKIN, pp. 5-6.
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culty will arise even under the best conditions imaginable for any large-
scale industrial society. As a result, the basic liberal approach to equal
opportunity, according to Fishkin, is no more than a collection of con-
flicting ideals.
38
The conflict among the principles of merit, equality of life chances,
and the autonomy of the family is demonstrated at length injustlce,
Equal Opportunity, and the Family. Taken together, the first and third
principles rule out the second because the autonomy of the family pro-
tects parental efforts to influence their children's development. Given
background conditions of inequality, children from the higher strata
will be systematically exposed to opportunities that can be expected to
give them advantages in meritocratic competition. 39 "Under these con-
ditions, the principle of merit-applied to talents as they have devel-
oped under such unequal conditions-becomes a mechanism for
generating unequal life chances."'' A commitment to both merit and
family autonomy thus precludes equality of life chances.
In a similar fashion, a commitment to equality and family autonomy
jeopardizes the merit principle. Only a process of assigning positions
that would be applied regardless of merit can equalize life chances in
light of the difference in talent development caused by the family's au-
tonomy. But, Fishkin contends, when merit selection is discarded, and a
system of reverse discrimination is systematically applied, efficiency and
fairness will suffer.41 Accepting this contention will leave us only the
"third option," which is coercive interference with family autonomy in
order to preserve the equality and merit principles.
If equality of life chances is to be achieved through processes consis-
tent with the principle of merit, conditions for the development of talent
must be equalized. "Given background conditions of inequality, this
can be done only through some mechanism that systematically insulates
the development of each new generation from the unequal results
38. Id. at 6, 9.
39. Id. at 51. Children from the higher strata can also be excluded from meritocratic
competition altogether. For example, undergraduate institutions of higher learning often
give preferential treatment in admissions to "the children of alumni, to the affluent who may
bestow their largess on the institutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the
famous, and the powerful." Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404
(1978) (Blackmun, J. concurring, dissenting).
40. FISHKIN, p. 51.
41. Id. at 61. Efficiency and fairness will suffer because a modern industrial society with
"a complex differentiation of tasks" requires the use of "qualifications that are performance
related" rather than mere "on-the-job training." Id. at 56, 62. Reverse discrimination has a
substantial cost in fairness because it interferes with the competition in which people earn
goods by their skill and effort. Id. at 1, 56.
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achieved by the last."' 42 Coercive intervention into the family's tradi-
tionally protected sphere is this new mechanism. It is designed to pre-
vent the advantaged from using the autonomy of the family to pass on
"cognitive, affective, cultural, and social advantages to their children. ' 43
What then does Fishkin actually want to do with the family? Though
he knows that children can suffer more harm than good when the state
interferes with the continuity of family relations, 44 he examines possible
strategies of intervention into the family. Any strategy which can close
the gap in the developmental conditions of rich and poor children will
be radical enough to require coercion if compliance is to be expected.
4 5
One policy, leveling up, involves either the replacement of parents by
"paraprofessionals" or "some complete transformation of parent-child
patterns of interaction. '46 The goal here is "a complete manipulation of
all the significant causal factors affecting the disadvantaged child.
'4 7
An alternative plan, leveling down, entails lowering the resources avail-
able to the more advantaged. 48 Although this policy appears less intru-
sive than leveling up, it too would entail coercion. Parents are not likely
to participate in policies which would render their offspring worse off.
These strategies of intervention into the family are no more desirable
than they are feasible. As Fishkin admits, they entail the risk not only of
prohibitive expenses but also the potential loss by parents of any paren-
tal role.4 9 Furthermore, the psychological costs for children of the inter-
vention into their family are apt to be high. 50 Apart from the systems of
intervention which, at least in the realm of political theory, have the
potential to equalize the developmental conditions of rich and poor chil-
dren, there are actual programs that have accomplished a great deal
while attempting less. The Yale Child Study Center is a case in point. 5 1
42. Id. at 64.
43. Id.
44. "[P]ractical experience in this field supports the conclusion that disruption of intact
families usually does more harm than good to the child, except in the most extreme cases of
deprivation or abuse." Id. at 77.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 77, 82.
47. Id. at 82.
48. Id. at 67-68.
49. Id. at 77.
50. Set J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 24.
51. One remarkable project at the Child Study Center attempted to aid the development
of disadvantaged children by focusing on their first thirty months of life. See S. PROVENCE &
A. NAYLOR, WORKING WITH DISADVANTAGED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: SCIENTIFIC
AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 8 (1983). The Child Study Center helped these children by provid-
ing them with health care and health supervision and by giving their parents guidance, coun-
seling, and developmental evaluations of the children. Id. at 157. These services were
provided in a framework that attempted to promote the vital relationship between the child
and parent. "[T]hose closest to the child, his parents, exert the strongest influence on his
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It is important that theory not lose sight of such valuable, if undramatic,
programs.
Fishkin's use of liberal theory leads him to consider some fairly unat-
tractive strategies of intervention into the family. To his credit, Fishkin
is aware of the difficulties inherent in these programs, and he is further
absolved by the context of his speculations-an examination of the
problems caused by liberal theory's shortcomings. But his cogent argu-
ment is open to criticism for the simplistic notion of "family autonomy"
deployed. In his belief that the family constitutes a sphere of liberty,
and his equation of state intervention with coercion, Fishkin treats the
family as if it were composed of equal parties. But equal parties do not
abuse one another, and Armstrong's The Home Front shows that families
have stronger and weaker members, whose relationship is often charac-
terized by great violence. State intervention can therefore mean not co-
ercion but protection.
A more general criticism can be made of Fishkin's view that the state
acts neutrally towards the family by leaving it alone. This position as-
sumes that the state plays no part in establishing the roles played within
the family. Despite the measure of privacy allowed the family, it does
not exist apart from the state, which sets the ground rules by which the
family exists. 52 Fishkin has made a rather neat separation between the
family and the state, a dichotomy of the sort which Francis Olson has
criticized as avoiding and displacing conflict while insuring that our
ideal images of both will remain incomplete.
53
Whatever criticisms one might make of Fishkin's notion of "family
autonomy," his suggestions for public policy remain sound. In those
actual circumstances when the autonomy of the family, merit selection,
and equality of life chances do conflict, there is a minimum requirement
which acceptable public policies should meet. Fishkin asks that no sac-
rifice be made in any of these three principles, "unless the sacrifice is neces-
sar for a gain in one or more of the other two, or unless there is some other
valuable gain."' 54 This requirement leads him to disagree with certain
programs of preferential treatment for minority group members, which
development and . . . his development [is] best followed, protected, and promoted by the
study staff through a continuing and close association with his parents-a partnership on
behalf of the child." Id. at 4.
52. As Philippe Aries and others have noted, the modern family is marked by a sense of
privacy and distance from the exterior world, see supra text accompanying note 1, but this
status is created by the state in the same sense that it creates the conditions which permit a
supposedly laissez-faire market to exist. See Olson, The Family and the Market, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983).
53. Olson, supra note 52 at 1529, 1569.
54. FISHKIN, p. 84 (emphasis in original).
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are objectionable when they amount to reverse discrimination. 55 Re-
verse discrimination when applied solely with reference to native char-
acteristics is objectionable because a significant sacrifice in merit
selection is not "counterbalanced" by any gain in equality of life
chances or the autonomy of the family.
56
His second suggestion for public policy follows as a result of the cur-
rent imperfect implementation of all three liberal assumptions. Depart-
ing from his use of ideal theory, Fishkin points out that as a result of
society's failure to establish these paradigms, each can be established
without a sacrifice in any of the others.57 For example, the racial and
ethnic discrimination that undermine true selection by merit must be
eradicated. Poor families must be granted the same autonomy given the
more affluent. And, most urgently, equality of life chances can be pro-
moted without requiring sacrifice in either merit or family autonomy.
This improvement of life chances can be made through familiar
methods: "We need to continue, indeed to expand, the Great Society's
wave of social experimentation with efforts to improve the developmen-
tal conditions of the least advantaged. '58 Fishkin's proposal seems un-
likely to meet with favor today for our society appears to have lost its
taste for the kind of social experimentation which he advocates. 59
The core insight of'Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family is that the
family can represent a barrier in the path to equal opportunity. In re-
sponse, Fishkin offers a theory of limited liberalism which invokes a plu-
55. Fishkin defines reverse discrimination as a "significant and widespread sacrifice of the
principle of merit in assignment in order to favor some specified group defined in terms of
arbitrary native characteristics (such as race, sex, or family background)." Id. at 87.
56. Id. at 89. There is no gain in these other principles because the beneficiaries of such
programs are often persons who are not disadvantaged themselves. If there is to be preferen-
tial treatment, Fishkin believes it should be directed specifically to disadvantaged individuals
so as to actually improve the equality of their life chances. Fishkin, p. 131. See N. GLAZER,
AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION 199-200 (1975). ("[R]acial and ethnic categories neither
properly group individuals who deserve redress on the basis of past discriminatory treatment,
nor properly group individuals who deserve redress on the basis of a present deprived condi-
tion"). But see Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT (Cohen, Nagel & Scanlon eds. 1977). (a careful attempt to justify group-ori-
ented programs of preferential treatment).
57. "In actual public policy ... we are very far from facing these trade-offs of ideal
theory. Each of the principles cited, while often invoked in public debates, is only imperfectly
implemented." FISHKIN, p. 147.
58. Id.
59. Indeed the reaction against the Great Society began not long after its implementa-
tion. See, e.g. THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS 238 (1975) ("Perhaps the greatest
dilemma in attempts to raise ethnic minority income is that those methods which have been
historically proved successful-self-reliance, work skills, education, business experience-are
all slow developing, while those methods which are more direct and immediate-job quotas,
charity, subsidies, preferential treatment-tend to undermine self-reliance and pride of
achievement in the long run.").
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rality of values to be weighed against each other.60 His hope is that
admitting the contradictions among some of liberalism's most cherished
values, rather than glossing them over, will lead to a more equitable
system of distributive justice. It serves as a powerful irony, however,
that Fishkin can make useful policy suggestions, for the most part, only
when departing from the level of ideal theory and imagined liberal plu-
ralism. 6 1 As for Armstrong's The Home Front, it is not the intelligent,
balanced study which the problem of domestic violence demands. Stop-
ping the violence which characterizes too many family relationships is a
critical challenge for our society, as is improving the opportunities avail-
able to members of disadvantaged families. If these problems are to be
solved, that most private of human associations must become the focus
of increasing public debate.
60. FISHKIN, p. 193.
61. More dramatic attempts have been made to come to grips with the shortcomings of
liberal theory. Among the most noteworthy is that of Roberto Unger, whose "total criticism"
of liberal doctrine-"the guard that watches over the prison house"-follows from a convic-
tion that partial critiques of this still dominant tradition can be taken no further. R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 2-3, 5-6 (1975).

